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Summary 
Social protection describes all public and private initiatives that provide income or consumption transfers 
to the poor, protect the vulnerable against livelihood risks, and enhance the social status and rights of the 
marginalised; with the overall objective of reducing the economic and social vulnerability of poor, 
vulnerable and marginalised groups. This paper argues against the popular perception of social protection 
as “social welfare programmes for poor countries”, consisting of costly targeted transfers to economically 
inactive or vulnerable groups. It also challenges the limited ambition of social protection policy in practice, 
which has moved little from its origins in the “social safety nets” discourse of the 1980s, and aims to 
provide “economic protection” against livelihood shocks, rather than “social protection” as broadly 
defined here. Instead, we argue that social protection can be affordable; it should extend to all of the 
population; it can contribute to the Millennium Development Goal of poverty reduction; and it can 
empower marginalised people and be socially “transformative”. 
 
 
 
 iv 
 v 
Contents 
 Summary  iii 
1 Introduction 1 
2 Conceptualising social protection 2 
 2.1 Current definitions of social protection 3 
 2.2 The Social Risk Management framework 5 
 2.3 Introducing the transformative element 8 
3 Social protection in practice: protection, prevention, promotion and 
 transformation 14 
 3.1 Protective social protection: non-formal social safety nets in Uganda 14 
 3.2 Preventive social protection: formal social security in Uganda 16 
 3.3 Protective/promotive social protection: school feeding 19 
 3.4 Promotive/transformative social protection: minimum wages 20 
 3.5 Transformative social protection: anti-discrimination campaigns 24 
4 Conclusion  26 
 References  28 
 
Tables 
Table 2.1  A framework for social protection programmes 13 
 
Figures 
Figure 2.1  A conceptual framework for social protection 11 
 
Boxes 
Box 2.1   Agency definitions of social protection 3 
 vi 
 
 
 1 
1  Introduction 
Social protection emerged as a critical response to the “safety nets” discourse of the late 1980s and early 
1990s. In the 1990 World Development Report, for instance, safety nets were very much the third prong of the 
World Bank’s three-pronged approach to “attacking poverty” (World Bank 1990), and were 
conceptualised as minimalist social assistance in countries too poor and administratively weak to introduce 
comprehensive social welfare programmes. During the 1990s, as thinking on livelihoods, risk and 
vulnerability, and the multi-dimensional nature of poverty became more nuanced, safety nets were 
increasingly criticised as residualist and paternalistic, and more sophisticated alternatives began to be 
proposed. At the same time, the broader potential of social protection began to be recognised, and bigger 
claims are now being made for what social protection can and should strive to achieve. 
There are two interconnected strands in this response, both linked to a concern for long-term and 
sustainable poverty reduction. The first links risk management explicitly with economic growth, and 
argues that reducing risk or protecting the poor against income and consumption variability will allow 
them to invest and accumulate – a “trampoline” out of poverty (World Bank 2000). Despite being 
vigorously promoted in international development publications, this link has not yet become a key 
component of anti-poverty programming in practice. In low-income countries, social protection continues 
to be perceived by governments and donors as comprising fiscally unsustainable “consumption” transfers 
to the economically inactive or unproductive poor, which diverts scarce public resources from 
“productive” investment for economic growth, and therefore deserves lower priority as a poverty 
reduction tool. 
At the same time, most advocates of social protection do not make the second connection which we 
argue is of fundamental importance to long-term poverty reduction, namely the positive relationship 
between livelihood security and enhanced autonomy or empowerment. Social protection continues to be 
conceptualised by development agencies mainly in terms of public responses to livelihood shocks – the 
conventional, narrowly specified “safety net” function. But this is “economic protection”, not “social 
protection”, and it is hardly socially transformative. Largely missing from the World Bank’s Social Risk 
Management framework, for instance, is a concern for equity and social rights. We argue that an 
appreciation of this second linkage can help create the policy conditions for a virtuous cycle of pro-poor 
growth, governance systems that are accountable and responsive to poorer as well as wealthier citizens, 
and an approach to development that is grounded in concerns for social equity. 
In an attempt to challenge the negative perceptions and narrow preconceptions that still surround 
social protection, this paper addresses three topical challenges in the policy literature: 
 
• Affordability: Given binding budget constraints, how can low-income countries deliver effective social 
protection to their vulnerable citizens at affordable cost? 
• Growth: Can social protection policies contribute to the Millennium Development Goal of halving 
extreme poverty and hunger, by supporting pro-poor economic growth? 
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• Equity: How can existing definitions and frameworks for social protection be extended to incorporate 
the “social” as well as “economic” aspects of risk and vulnerability? 
 
Recent thinking and research is starting to provide some encouraging answers to these questions, and is 
demonstrating their positive interconnections. For instance: 
 
• Many forms of social protection are affordable even in the poorest countries, especially those that are 
not based on large or repeated income transfers to beneficiaries, but instead provide protection to 
the poor and vulnerable through, say, legislative change. 
• Evidence is accumulating that social protection can contribute, both directly and indirectly, to 
economic growth and poverty reduction: 
• Directly: redistributive transfers raise the incomes and smooth the consumption of the poor, 
which also allows them to engage in moderate risk-taking, and to protect rather than erode their 
asset holdings when confronted by livelihood shocks; 
• Indirectly: several social protection mechanisms contribute to economic growth through asset 
creation (e.g. public works programmes build infrastructure, school feeding schemes invest in 
human capital), and income or employment multipliers. 
• “Rights-based approaches” to development focus explicitly on social equity concerns, and propose 
interventions that modify prejudicial attitudes and behaviours towards socially vulnerable groups – 
such as challenging customary law on inheritance rights to protect widows; introducing minimum 
wages for low-paid workers; and sensitisation campaigns to protect people living with HIV/AIDS 
against discrimination. 
 
This paper is structured into two main sections. The next section is conceptual: it reviews current social 
protection definitions and analytical frameworks, identifies several limitations of these, and presents our 
own conceptualisation, which highlights the “transformative” potential of social protection. The following 
section considers social protection policies in practice, by discussing several measures that can be labelled 
as “protective”, “preventive”, “promotive”, and “transformative” social protection. The paper concludes 
by reasserting the case for social protection as supporting social as well as economic goals of 
development. 
 
2  Conceptualising social protection 
This section of the paper presents some currently influential definitions of social protection, critically 
assesses the World Bank’s Social Risk Management framework, and proposes a new definition and 
analytical framework that incorporates a “transformative” element which recognises the need for social 
equity as well as protection against livelihood risks. 
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2.1 Current definitions of social protection 
Although social protection has recently become mainstreamed in development discourse, it remains a 
term that is unfamiliar to many and carries a range of definitions, both in the development studies 
literature and among policymakers responsible for implementing social protection programmes. One 
inevitable result of this proliferation of concepts and understandings is confusion: the core components 
and boundaries of social protection are far from agreed, and different stakeholders perceive social 
protection in very different ways. For example: 
 
(i) Some see social protection narrowly, essentially as a new label for old-style social welfare provided to 
the “deserving poor” (e.g. widows and orphans, or people with disabilities). 
(ii) Many policymakers continue to equate social protection with social safety nets, or interventions that 
cushion the poor against production and consumption shocks, such as food aid for drought-affected 
farmers in subsistence-oriented communities. 
(iii) Others adopt a very broad approach, including education and health subsidies, job creation and 
microcredit programmes, as well as safety nets for groups that may be vulnerable to shocks, but are 
not usually regarded as among the poorest strata of society (e.g. coffee farmers facing falling export 
prices). 
(iv) A more “political” or “transformative” view extends social protection to arenas such as equity, 
empowerment and economic, social and cultural rights, rather than confining the scope of social 
protection to targeted income and consumption transfers. 
 
Some current definitions of social protection from the policy literature are listed in Box 2.1. 
 
 
Box 2.1 Agency definitions of social protection 
‘Social protection refers to the public actions taken in response to levels of vulnerability, risk and 
deprivation which are deemed socially unacceptable within a given polity or society’. Overseas 
Development Institute (ODI) 
 
‘Social protection is a collection of measures to improve or protect human capital, ranging from labor 
market interventions, publicly mandated unemployment or old-age insurance to targeted income support. 
Social protection interventions assist individuals, households, and communities to better manage the 
income risks that leave people vulnerable’. World Bank 
 
Social protection is ‘the provision of benefits to households and individuals through public or collective 
arrangements to protect against low or declining living standards’. International Labour Office (ILO) 
 
Social protection is defined as ‘the set of policies and programs designed to reduce poverty and 
vulnerability by promoting efficient labor markets, diminishing people’s exposure to risks, and enhancing 
their capacity to protect themselves against hazards and interruption/loss of income’. Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) 
 
Sources: Norton, Conway and Foster (2000) (ODI); World Bank (2004) (World Bank); van Ginneken (1999) 
(ILO); Ortiz (2001) (ADB). 
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All the definitions in Box 2.1 share three common elements that we would question: 
 
1) Problem identification: According to all these agencies, social protection is required to address a 
narrowly specified set of economic problems or livelihood shocks – ‘in response to [unacceptable] 
levels of vulnerability, risk and deprivation’, ‘managing income risks’, ‘protect against low or declining 
living standards’, ‘protect individuals from the risks inherent in earning a living’. This view excludes 
many elements that we believe should be included in the list of concerns addressed by social 
protection, particularly “social risks” such as child labour, domestic violence, armed conflict and 
ethnic discrimination. 
2) Problem prioritisation: Each definition prioritises a slightly different set of problems – either ‘low’ 
levels of income or living standards; or ‘downward fluctuations in incomes’ and ‘declining living 
standards’. In our view, social protection should address both types of livelihood threat: vulnerability 
associated with “being poor” (for which social assistance is needed), and vulnerability associated with 
the risk of “becoming poor” (for which social insurance is needed), as well as social injustice arising 
from structural inequalities and abuses of power (for which “social equity” is needed). 
3) Social protection providers: Each definition refers to ‘public actions’, ‘public or collective 
arrangements’, or ‘a set of policies and programs’ – clearly, it is assumed that social protection is 
delivered mainly through “public” (government) agencies; only the ILO mentions other forms of 
“collective” provision, which presumably would include community-based and private sector 
institutions. This paper favours a broader classification of social protection providers, including 
formal (“public” and “private”) as well as informal (“collective” or “community-level”) sources. 
 
An additional layer of confusion comes from the fact that different agencies subscribe to different 
frameworks when elucidating and implementing their social protection policies. For example, the ILO has 
developed a framework, derived largely from the work of Guhan (1994), which asserts that social 
protection in poor countries must be viewed ‘as part of, and fully integrated with anti-poverty policies, 
with such policies themselves being broadly conceived in view of the complex, multi-dimensional nature 
of poverty and deprivation’ (Guhan 1994: 38). Within the ILO framework, social protection is 
differentiated between: 
 
• protective measures – which have the specific objective of guaranteeing relief from deprivation; 
• preventive measures – which directly seek to avert deprivation in various ways; and 
• promotional measures – which aim to enhance real incomes and capabilities. 
 
The categories are intended to suggest a gradation of interventions, proceeding from a narrow domain 
(protection measures in the form of, say, safety nets) to increasingly broader domains (preventive and 
even promotional measures). One strength of the ILO framework is its broad conceptualisation of 
poverty and vulnerability, which allows the notion of deprivation to be defined along multiple lines, over 
and above income and consumption poverty. A possible critique is that including the promotional element 
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allows social protection to be conceptualised so broadly as to include almost all elements of the 
development agenda. According to Sabates-Wheeler and Waite (2003: 6), the ILO agenda can become 
operationally manageable ‘by defining specific sections of the society that qualify for social protection, or 
by focusing on one or two elements within the framework. A further benefit to retaining the “promotive” 
element is that it encourages and affords donors, NGOs, governments and informal systems (such as the 
extended family or burial societies) an exit strategy in the longer-run’. 
 
2.2 The Social Risk Management framework 
The World Bank’s Social Risk Management framework (SRM) has emerged in recent years as the 
dominant framework for conceptualising social protection. Social risk management ‘consists of a 
collection of public measures intended to assist individuals, households and communities in managing 
risks in order to reduce vulnerability, improve consumption smoothing, and enhance equity while 
contributing to economic development in a participatory manner’ (Holzmann and Jørgensen 1999). The 
SRM framework is an analytical tool to identify alternative strategies and arrangements for dealing with 
risks, and it has four basic elements (sometimes a fifth element – risk analysis – is also included): 
 
1) The type of income risk incurred: This element traces the impacts of shocks and risks on various 
livelihood assets (financial, human capital, land, social assets). The World Development Report’s 
(2000/2001) table on ‘Main sources of risk’ (World Bank 2000: 136) provides the basis for this 
framework. 
2) The type of strategies to address income shocks: 
• Risk reduction: ex ante actions to increase the level of expected income or reduce variations; 
• Risk mitigation: ex ante actions to reduce the income variance if a shock were to occur (portfolio 
diversification), e.g. holding multiple assets with different risk characteristics or insurance i.e. 
pooled coverage through payment of insurance premium or hedging (risk exchange); 
• Risk coping: ex post actions to alleviate the impact of a shock (e.g. borrowing or dis-saving, 
charity, means-tested transfers, public works programmes). 
3) The type of instruments by formality of arrangements: These range from informal or personal 
arrangements, such as marriage, real assets such as cattle or gold, community support; to market-
based arrangements, such as financial assets and insurance markets; to formal or publicly mandated 
or provided arrangements, such as rules, laws, social insurance, and welfare transfers. 
4) The type of institutions and actors involved: The SRM framework recognises that a diverse range 
of actors can be involved in social protection provision, including state institutions, market-based 
institutions, international donor agencies, NGOs and charities, households and individuals. 
 
The SRM framework’s rise to prominence has occurred over the last five years and has been greatly 
facilitated by a five-day training workshop on social protection, run by the World Bank Institute, that 
government officials from developing countries are encouraged to attend. The SRM training programme 
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is designed for ‘high and mid-level government officials from the ministries of finance, economics and 
planning, labor and social affairs, parliamentarians, project staff, policy analysts and field staff from 
NGOs, and, because of the multi-sectoral quality of the Social Risk Management approach, researchers 
and trainers from academic institutions’.1 The training programme has been rolled out in more than 20 
African countries, and includes seminars, workshops in Washington D.C. or Paris, video-conferences, and 
regional workshops. 
The terminology of this framework has become so well entrenched in the language of officials in a 
number of African countries that attempts to use different terminologies or concepts to discuss social 
protection is problematic. However, we argue that there are a number of reasons why this framework and 
its terminology should not be accepted as the “truth about social protection”. Specifically, the Social Risk 
Management framework: 
 
• reflects a limited conceptualisation of vulnerability; 
• does not explicitly address the chronic (core) poor; 
• concerns itself predominantly with public (state, donor or NGO) and market-based social protection 
strategies; 
• encourages a limited role for government in social protection provision. 
 
Limited conceptualisation of vulnerability 
Vulnerability can be conceptualised in a variety of ways, depending critically on the unit of analysis. Within 
the SRM framework (as in most literature on social protection) vulnerability is attributed to the 
characteristic of a person or group, an event affecting a person or group, or a point in a person’s life-cycle. 
For instance, people living with disabilities can be characterised as more or less vulnerable than people 
living without disabilities in any given context. This type of analysis tends to classify vulnerability 
according to a range of risks or shocks that affect one or more of a variety of livelihood assets (World 
Bank 2000: 136–38). This is reflected in the range of policy instruments proposed, such as reception 
centres for orphans, shelters for domestically abused women, disability aids for farmers living with 
disabilities, foodgrain warehouses, and various social assistance programmes (World Bank 2000: 141). 
However, if rather than focusing on risk as an exogenously given factor to be managed, vulnerability is 
conceptualised as emerging from and embedded in the socio-political context, then our attention would 
no longer be focused on how to design a policy so that various groups face less risk in a given context, but 
on how to change this context to minimise risk for a range of vulnerable groups.2 
The SRM framework mainly addresses economic risks to incomes and assets (World Bank 2000: 
138). Absent from the framework are “social risks” that also contribute to poverty and vulnerability. This 
is evidenced by the way in which social inclusion, social cohesion and social stability are treated as positive 
externalities of well-designed SRM interventions. Social risks may be categorised as “structural” or 
                                                  
1 www.worldbank.org/wbi/socialriskmanagement/srmafrica/objectives.html (accessed 9 August 2004). 
2 For a more detailed discussion, see Sabates-Wheeler and Waite (2003). 
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“contingent”. The former refers to situations where groups or individuals are marginalised or 
discriminated against, and by nature have longer term implications for poverty and vulnerability than the 
latter. Contingent risk is a function of environmental or economic factors, such as an earthquake, or 
hyper-inflation. Because the SRM framework is largely focused on income variability, with other (especially 
social) dimensions of vulnerability being effectively overlooked, we argue that the SRM approach does not 
incorporate a comprehensive understanding of vulnerability, and is therefore limited in its scope and 
purpose of social protection provisions. 
 
Does not explicitly address the chronic (core) poor 
The chronic poor include those who have never recovered from a severe shock, such as a disabling illness 
or loss of assets. In their analysis of chronic poverty and social protection, Barrientos and Shepherd (2003: 
7) state that: ‘Although risk and vulnerability are key factors in explaining the descent into poverty, it is 
not clear . . . how important they are in maintaining people in poverty, transmitting poverty from one 
generation to the next, and in preventing the interruption of poverty’. Importantly, their paper highlights 
structural reasons related to ‘social, political and economic structures and relationships, and processes of 
exclusion and adverse incorporation’ (Barrientos and Shepherd 2003: 3) that prevent some of the 
chronically poor benefiting from development policies and market changes. The chronic poor ‘have fewer 
options, less freedom to take up available options, and so remain stuck in patterns of life which give them 
low returns to whatever few assets they have maintained’ (Hulme, Moore and Shepherd 2001: 8). This 
observation is similar to the point made above, however here we do not see a clear distinction between 
risk and vulnerability, and structural factors as determinants of poverty. We would argue that structural 
factors cannot be disentangled from determinants of risk and vulnerability. Social, political and economic 
structures are typically the defining characteristics of livelihood risk, with the possible exception of some 
natural disasters – though even in these cases, the contributions of socio-political factors and human 
agency have been persistently under-appreciated (Bankoff et al. 2004). 
The SRM framework remains rooted in a safety nets agenda (see discussion on pages 146–9 of the 
World Development Report 2000/2001). That is, it proposes to put instruments in place to catch and 
protect people when they face short-run shocks and livelihood risks.3 However, a commitment to long-
term, chronic poverty reduction requires that social protection is conceptualised as more than just safety 
nets – interventions must provide support for the “chronic poor” as well as the “transitory poor”, and 
they must extend beyond just protecting consumption against transitory economic shocks. 
 
Focuses on public and market-based social protection strategies 
Discussions of social protection in Western countries typically limit their thinking to a narrow technical 
conceptualisation of specific  state-funded and  state-managed programmes.  However,  in poor countries, 
                                                  
3 This is particularly apparent if we consider ‘Mechanisms for Managing Risks’ – the last row of the matrix in the 
World Development Report 2000/2001 (World Bank 2000: 141). 
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due to a variety of constraints that restrict the range of social protection services offered by the welfare 
state, the concept of social protection must be widened to include both private and public mechanisms for 
social protection provisioning. Among others, these constraints include: 
 
• limited scope for private insurance against risk, given the underdeveloped nature of credit and 
insurance markets; 
• limited scope for social insurance, given high levels of self-employment, of unstable and irregular 
wage employment and widespread underemployment (rather than unemployment); 
• limited resources for formal social protection measures, given low tax-generated revenue and 
competing demands on the national budget; 
• limitations in reaching rural (and even urban informal sector) populations who are spatially scattered, 
occupationally diverse and administratively difficult to service. 
 
For these reasons, social protection in poor countries needs to be conceived of more broadly and 
creatively than in industrialised countries. We argue that an important role exists for non-formal systems 
of social protection, for instance, those based on kinship and traditional institutions of reciprocity and 
dependency. 
 
Envisages a limited role for government in social protection provisions 
As pointed out by MacKinnon (2002): ‘within the SRM framework the role of public social protection 
institutions are envisaged as playing a somewhat prescriptive and limited role as a means only to 
compensate for market failure’. Holzmann and Jørgensen (2000: 28) explicitly state that social protection 
will: ‘provide risk management instruments where the private sector fails’; ‘enact income redistribution if 
market outcomes are unacceptable’, and that government should mainly provide ‘social safety nets for risk 
coping’. The World Bank’s limited expectations regarding the appropriate role for government in social 
protection provision is presented most clearly in the latter quote, which reflects the World Bank’s true 
intentions in terms of limiting the wider risk-mitigating role of public social protection systems. In 
contrast, we argue that the government should play a central role in providing and facilitating the 
provision of social protection. Especially in situations of widespread poverty, where insurance 
mechanisms of the poor are ineffective, and there is likely to be under-provision by private providers, the 
case for public intervention by the state is strong. 
 
2.3 Introducing the transformative element 
If the need for social protection is defined in the narrow “safety net” sense, as mechanisms for smoothing 
consumption in response to declining or fluctuating incomes, then the focus of interventions will logically 
be on targeted income or consumption transfers to affected individuals. In our view, the range of 
interventions that can contribute to the provision of social protection is much broader than resource 
transfers, though these are obviously important in cases where vulnerable groups are literally unable to 
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survive on their own resources. Targeted income transfers provide “economic protection” in response to 
economic risks and livelihood vulnerability. Other forms of “social protection” would address distinct 
problems of “social vulnerability”, not necessarily through resource transfers, but through delivery of 
social services, and through measures to modify or regulate behaviour towards socially vulnerable groups. 
Strategies to deal with problems of social vulnerability require a transformative element, where 
“transformative” refers to the need to pursue policies that relate to power imbalances in society that 
encourage, create and sustain vulnerabilities. For instance, support to trade unions may enable socially 
marginalised groups to claim rights to livelihood enhancing assets; sensitisation and awareness-raising 
campaigns can transform public attitudes and behaviour; and changes to the regulatory framework could 
protect vulnerable or minority groups against discrimination and abuse. 
Another sphere where transformative social protection policies may be needed is the intra-household 
division of resource ownership, access and use. For instance, many of the difficulties involved in the 
provision of social protection for women relates to socio-cultural values that leave women in vulnerable 
positions. Clearly, social protection instruments designed for many categories of women must include a 
substantial “transformative” element, in the sense that power relations between men and women become 
more balanced. Appropriate legislation is necessary, but this goes only a small way to changing socio-
cultural values. Efforts could focus on educating men and women about their rights and how to access 
their rights. Other more political and institutional constraints relate to: lack of access to the legal system; 
cultural resistance; and commonly held beliefs about women’s role in land management and ownership. 
Bearing the above points in mind, we have devised our own conceptual and operational definitions 
of social protection. We utilise the terminology set out by Guhan (above), as this does not limit social 
protection to economic risk and vulnerability. Our conceptual definition is as follows: 
 
SOCIAL PROTECTION describes all public and private initiatives that provide income or consumption transfers to the 
poor, protect the vulnerable against livelihood risks, and enhance the social status and rights of the marginalised; with 
the overall objective of reducing the economic and social vulnerability of poor, vulnerable and marginalised groups. 
 
Our working definition elaborates on the mechanisms that deliver social protection: 
 
SOCIAL PROTECTION is the set of all initiatives, both formal and informal, that provide: social assistance to 
extremely poor individuals and households; social services to groups who need special care or would otherwise be 
denied access to basic services; social insurance to protect people against the risks and consequences of livelihood 
shocks; and social equity to protect people against social risks such as discrimination or abuse. 
 
The key objective of social protection is to reduce the vulnerability of the poor. The full range of social 
protection interventions can be categorised under protective, preventive, promotive and transformative 
measures. 
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Protective measures provide relief from deprivation. Protective measures are narrowly targeted safety 
net measures in the conventional sense – they aim to provide relief from poverty and deprivation to the 
extent that promotional and preventive measures have failed to do so. Protective measures include social 
assistance for the “chronically poor”, especially those who are unable to work and earn their livelihood. 
This equates most closely to mainstream “social welfare”. Social assistance programmes typically include 
targeted resource transfers – disability benefit, single-parent allowances, and “social pensions” for the 
elderly poor that are financed publicly – out of the tax base, with donor support, and/or through NGO 
projects. Other protective measures can be classified as social services. These would be for the poor and 
groups needing special care, including orphanages and  reception centres for  abandoned children,  feeding 
camps and provision of services for refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), and the abolition 
of health and education charges (as with Uganda’s Universal Primary Education policy) in order to extend 
access to basic services to the very poor. 
 
Preventive measures seek to avert deprivation. Preventive measures deal directly with poverty 
alleviation. They include social insurance for “economically vulnerable groups” – people who have fallen or 
might fall into poverty, and may need support to help them manage their livelihood shocks. This is similar 
to “social safety nets”. Social insurance programmes refer to formalised systems of pensions, health 
insurance, maternity benefit and unemployment benefits, often with tripartite financing between 
employers, employees and the state. They also include informal mechanisms, such as savings clubs and 
funeral societies. Strategies of risk diversification – such as crop or income diversification – are also 
considered as preventive measures. 
 
Promotive measures aim to enhance real incomes and capabilities, which is achieved through a range of 
livelihood-enhancing programmes targeted at households and individuals, such as microfinance and 
school feeding. The inclusion of promotive measures as a category here is open to the criticism that it 
takes social protection too far beyond its original conceptualisation. However, the intention is not to 
broaden the scope to include (potentially) all development initiatives, but to focus on promotive measures 
that have income stabilisation at least as one objective. A case in point is microcredit that fulfils income 
stabilising and consumption smoothing functions. 
 
Transformative measures seek to address concerns of social equity and exclusion, such as collective action 
for workers’ rights, or upholding human rights for minority ethnic groups. Transformative interventions 
include changes to the regulatory framework to protect “socially vulnerable groups” (e.g. people with 
disabilities, or victims of domestic violence) against discrimination and abuse, as well as sensitisation 
campaigns (such as the ‘HIV/AIDS Anti-Stigma Campaign’, which is discussed later in this paper) to 
transform public attitudes and behaviour and enhance social equity. 
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These categories may overlap, in that some measures could simultaneously “promote” incomes as well as 
“prevent” deprivation. Public works projects, for instance, aim both at transferring short-term food or 
cash and building useful long-term infrastructure. Figure 2.1 illustrates the relationship between these 
measures and presents a new conceptual framework for thinking about social protection. The solid black 
lines indicate an obvious and direct relationship. For instance, preventive policies, such as crop 
diversification to reduce future risk, may also have promotive aspects of social protection in the sense that 
a wider crop portfolio may lead to a competitive market advantage. Most preventive mechanisms could be 
argued to have promotive effects, in the sense that risk reduction enables people to take advantage of 
opportunities that they would otherwise have been unable to do. 
 
Figure 2.1 A conceptual framework for social protection 
 
The thick dashed lines indicate a less obvious relationship. For instance, some preventive mechanisms can 
be transformative, and vice versa, but this relationship is not strong, nor inevitable. One example is 
microfinance schemes that simultaneously provide both social insurance and economic opportunities, and 
often have knock-on effects by empowering individuals within their households, and households within 
their communities. Similarly, some social protection instruments, such as minimum wage legislation, can 
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be both promotive and transformative (see Section 3.4). Paying workers a fair wage enhances their 
incomes and capabilities. At the same time, the very process of bargaining with employers to enforce the 
minimum wage – through trade unions or public campaigns, and with explicit government support – can 
be empowering and have positive transformative implications. 
The thin dotted line indicates a weak relationship between the protective and promotive aspects of 
social protection, to highlight the possibility that safety nets may in some cases enable people to take 
opportunities that otherwise they would not have taken, to enhance their economic opportunities. In the 
following section of this paper we draw on the example of school feeding schemes to illustrate this 
linkage. Finally, the very thick dashed line indicates that many protective measures can have the 
unfortunate effect of reinforcing established power hierarchies and patterns of exclusion. Furthermore, 
they can introduce social polarisation. For instance, some targeting mechanisms that are applied on public 
works or school feeding schemes can have stigmatising effects that create social tensions and exacerbate 
vulnerabilities. For this reason alone, progressive thinking on social protection must move beyond 
equating social protection exclusively with safety nets. 
Having now considered different categories of instruments, it is important to consider their intended 
beneficiaries. Our operational definition and conceptual framework, as presented above, cover three 
categories of people in need of social protection: 
 
1) the chronically poor 
2) the economically vulnerable 
3) the socially marginalised. 
 
Often these categories overlap, because of the composite nature of vulnerability. For instance, socially 
marginalised groups – e.g. ethnic minorities, people living with AIDS or disability – are often 
economically vulnerable as well, being unable to work (in the case of the severely disabled or terminally ill) 
or being confined to low status livelihood activities that generate low and variable incomes (e.g. beggars). 
Another way of expressing this is that the weakest members of society are usually those who are both 
economically and socially vulnerable – because these sources of vulnerability interact with and reinforce 
each other – and they are often in greatest and most urgent need of social protection. 
The specific instruments, mechanisms and actors involved in social protection provisioning are by no 
means new. In its narrowest conceptualisation, social protection is equated with social security, where 
social security is often interpreted as meaning the specific public programmes of assistance, insurance and 
benefits that people can draw upon in order to maintain a minimum level of income. Our approach 
identifies four sets of interventions that are required to address adequately the social protection needs of 
the three vulnerable groups listed above. Table 2.1 summarises these distinctions between different 
categories of vulnerability and examples of “vulnerable groups”, and different categories of interventions, 
with examples of social protection programmes associated with each category. 
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Table 2.1 A framework for social protection programmes 
Vulnerability 
categories 
Examples of 
affected groups 
 
Category of 
interventions 
Types of programmes 
Severely disabled  Disability benefit 
Terminally ill  Single-parent allowances 
Ethnic minorities  Social pensions 
Urban unemployed  Food aid  
Pastoralists  
Social 
Assistance 
Food-for-work 
Chronically 
Poor 
Subsistence smallholders  Formalised pensions 
Cash crop farmers  Unemployment benefits 
Internally Displaced 
Persons 
 Health insurance 
Orphans  Maternity benefits 
Informal sector workers  
Social insurance 
Burial societies 
Widows 
Economically 
at risk 
The elderly 
 Changes to regulatory 
framework to protect 
vulnerable groups  
Ethnic minorities 
Abducted children 
 
Operationalising economic, 
social and cultural rights 
People living with AIDS  
Transformative 
action 
Sensitisation campaigns 
Victims of domestic abuse  Community based care 
People with disabilities  Orphanages 
Street children  Refugee/IDP camps 
Socially 
vulnerable 
Female-headed households  
Social services 
Crèches/pre-schools 
 
Source: Devereux et al. (2002). 
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3  Social protection in practice: protection, prevention, promotion and 
transformation 
This section presents practical examples of social protection measures under the four categories as set out 
in the framework above: protective, preventive, promotive, and transformative. In each case, an 
application will be made to the specific context of Uganda. It should also be emphasised that many 
interventions that can be considered as social protection measures have more than one objective, and are 
therefore discussed as both protective and promotive (as in the case of school feeding schemes), or as 
both promotive and transformative (as in the case of minimum wage legislation). 
 
3.1 Protective social protection: non-formal social safety nets in Uganda 
Non-formal social security provision refers both to “traditional” or “indigenous” systems of extended 
family, kinship and community support, and to new institutional forms that have emerged in response to 
the inaccessibility of formal social security, rising needs for social security support, and the declining 
ability of informal networks to address these needs. In contemporary Africa, these self-help and mutual 
aid mechanisms include various forms of cooperatives, market associations, savings and credit clubs, and 
burial societies. 
The conventional view on the evolution of social protection in sub-Saharan Africa follows a similar 
trajectory across most countries in the region. The narrative can be divided crudely into three phases: pre-
colonial, colonial, and post-independence. 
The popular view is that pre-colonial Africans lived in mutual support networks of community, 
extended family and clan groups. ‘Reciprocity and social cohesion [were] the two pillars of traditional 
social protection . . . acts of reciprocity, altruism, social cohesion and personal intimacies were sufficient to 
guarantee social protection in both good and bad times to all members of any ethnic nationality by 
ensuring equity and social justice’ (Ouma 1995: 6). Other writers have challenged this optimistic and 
benevolent view of the role and resilience of “traditional” institutions of social protection in Africa, 
arguing that there is a “dark side” to social capital – e.g. it fails to recognise that ‘the moral economy . . . 
often engenders relations of subservience and dependence’ (Davies 1996: 37), or that the burden of caring 
for relatives (especially the ill and infirm) falls mainly on women – and over-estimates the capacity of these 
mechanisms to deal with shocks, especially at the community level. 
The erosion of these informal support systems is often attributed to the disruptive impacts of 
colonialism and commodification. Politically, the undermining of village- and clan-based power 
relationships ‘inevitably undermined the authority of the kinship system in matters of socialisation and 
social control – thus in turn undermining its ability to protect socially vulnerable groups such as the aged 
and the sick’ (Ouma 1995: 6). Economically, the commercialisation of labour and the increasing cash 
orientation of economic activity (to pay taxes or purchase goods and services) undermined individual acts 
of altruism or reciprocity (e.g. neighbours assisting each other with farming chores) or collective efforts 
(e.g. building or maintaining community infrastructure). 
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In a relatively little-known contribution to this literature, Amartya Sen (1980) once wrote about a 
phase of development between the non-market economy and the market economy. This is a period during 
which a population group or society finds its traditional locally-based socioeconomic systems disrupted by 
processes of “modernisation”, but the economy and administrative infrastructure have not yet evolved to 
a point where effective social protection can be provided to vulnerable members of society through the 
centralised mechanisms of taxation and redistribution: 
 
. . . in the process of industrialisation or colonial development a precapitalist economy typically seems 
to go through a phase in which its traditional sources of nonexchange income (cultivation of own 
land) contract sharply much before the modern sources of non-exchange income (social security) 
expand or even come into existence. There is, then, a much enhanced dependence on the exchange 
system for one's survival. 
(Sen 1980: 31) 
 
Sen labelled this phase ‘PEST’, meaning ‘pre-existing systems transition’. Elsewhere, Sen (1981: 173) 
wrote that: ‘The phase of economic development after the emergence of a large class of wage labourers but 
before the development of social security arrangements is potentially a deeply vulnerable one’. Much of the 
population of contemporary rural Uganda can arguably be characterised as surviving in this transitional 
‘PEST’ phase – a situation of heightened vulnerability and reduced capacity to mitigate risks and cope with 
shocks. 
In the specific context of Uganda’s post-independence history, the political turbulence and state 
violence of the 1970s and early 1980s is often seen as further eroding or demolishing informal social 
protection mechanisms, due to the death or displacement of individuals, families and entire communities. 
Civil instability remains a disruptive factor in parts of Uganda even today, notably in the north where the 
Lord’s Resistance Army is pursuing a campaign of terror and destabilisation based on mutilation, killing, 
and abduction of children. An additional stress on informal social protection has been posed by AIDS. In 
the 1980s, Uganda was the epicentre of the first wave of the pandemic in Africa, and although HIV-
prevalence appears to be levelling off, the legacy in terms of impoverishment and orphans continues to 
impose heavy burdens on both kin-based and formal social protection mechanisms. 
A recent study of community and kinship-based social security systems found these to be widespread 
and significant, but declining in effectiveness and resilience, due to increasing pressures caused by 
processes such as HIV/AIDS and the commercialisation of social relations (Kasente et al. 2002). Non-
formal social security institutions in Uganda include the kinship and extended family systems – though 
these have been described as “gradually disintegrating” – and mutual aid groups (e.g. burial societies, 
savings clubs and rotating credit associations). The tradition of mutual assistance is known in Uganda as 
‘munno mu kabi’ (‘friend in need’). The effectiveness of these systems in terms of providing social 
protection is also limited by their low capital base, due to small contributions by members, and limited 
financial management skills. Another important point is that ‘kinship-based social protection tends to 
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exploit women to the benefit of other family members, without guaranteeing their own social protection’ 
(Kasente et al. 2002: 178). Most notably, it is women who are taking on most of the burden of caring for 
orphans. 
 
3.2 Preventive social protection: formal social security in Uganda 
Western-style social security, which depends on regular contributions by wage-earners and employers, 
reaches only a small minority of citizens in most African countries – just 6 per cent of Tanzanians, for 
instance (Mchomvu et al. 2002). Unemployment insurance, occupational pensions, paid maternity and sick 
leave, disability insurance and so on are inaccessible and even inappropriate for the majority of Africans, 
who live outside formal employment and survive on low and irregular earnings. In Uganda, formal social 
security mechanisms cover some of the least vulnerable groups of citizens: government workers and 
private sector employees. ‘The social security legislation in force is designed for employees in the formal 
sector, including the public service, and thus is inapplicable to the 80 per cent of the labour force 
employed in agriculture and associated pursuits who are classified as self-employed, own-account workers 
and unpaid family workers’ (ILO/UNDP 1996: 14). 
Much effort has gone into reforming Uganda’s social security system over the past decade. In 1996 
the ILO and UNDP submitted a commissioned ‘Report to the Government on the Development of 
Social Protection’, which recommended a three-tier structure of social protection: 
 
1. a tax-financed tier of primary level services and minimum incomes for those in the greatest 
need; 
2. a compulsory social insurance tier relying on solidarity and resources contributed by employers 
and employees; 
3. a complementary tier giving scope to individuals and employers to obtain additional protection 
as required. 
(ILO/UNDP 1996: 4) 
 
Arguably, the first tier will always face binding budget constraints. The capacity of the Ugandan state to 
deliver social protection is severely constrained by the country’s narrow tax base and low ratio of 
taxpayers to non-taxpayers. (‘ . . . less than 15 per cent of Uganda’s population is in remunerated 
employment while the majority still remain in the rural and non-formal sector. The tax base, therefore, is 
small’ (Ouma 1995: 11) .) ‘In the long-run, arrangements for modern social protection will have to be 
broadened and extended to the more populous countryside . . . In the meantime, however, socioeconomic 
development must precede the emergence of a comprehensive social insurance scheme’ (Ouma 1995: 11). 
The ILO/UNDP report acknowledged the problem of large uncovered sections of the population with 
substantial unmet needs, but offered few ideas on how to extend coverage to them. (‘Social security 
coverage by contributory schemes is a long term goal . . .’ (ILO/UNDP 1996: 35) .) For instance, the 
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report recognised that the urban informal sector is an important source of livelihood for increasing 
numbers of poor Ugandans, but that there is little or no formal social protection for these workers. 
The second tier covers those Ugandans who are employed in establishments of five or more 
employees, and comprises two institutions: the National Social Security Fund (NSSF) for private sector 
employees, and the Public Service Pension Scheme (PSPS) for public sector employees. The NSSF 
operates a defined contribution scheme funded out of mandatory contributions by employers (10 per cent 
of wages), and employees (5 per cent of wages), while the PSPS is a “defined benefit” scheme funded out 
of general revenues. The NSSF is essentially a compulsory savings scheme, which pays out a lump sum to 
the employee on termination of employment due to retirement, disability or death. The ILO/UNDP 
study recommended “liberalisation” of the NSSF, exposing it to competition from private providers and 
encouraging it to offer a wider range of financial products and services. The report had little to offer for 
workers employed or self-employed outside the formal sector. 
In July 2000 a paper was submitted to the Presidential Economic Council by the Director of 
Economic Affairs, titled ‘A Contribution Towards a Comprehensive View of Social Security Reform in 
Uganda’ (Suruma 2000). This paper adopted a broad definition of social security: 
 
social security is comprehensively defined as that ideal where there is security of income for every 
citizen of Uganda. Under this ideal, every citizen is assured of access to the basic requirements of life 
namely, food, shelter, clothing, education and healthcare. The right of access to these basic needs is 
essentially unconditional . . . As such, civilised society is obliged to make arrangements for the 
protection of all categories of society. 
(Suruma 2000: 3-4) 
 
Although this paper focuses on government-managed pension funds (NSSF and PSPS) and private sector 
pension providers, it argues against liberalisation of the NSSF, on the grounds that the state has a 
responsibility to protect its citizens that cannot be met through private provision. ‘Liberalisation without 
social security or social responsibility will create a harsher and more dangerous society’ (Suruma 2000: 
10-11). It also emphasises the needs of groups who fall outside the reach of the public and private sector 
providers of social security, concluding that: ‘Uganda needs a vision of social security that includes caring 
for “the destitute, the disabled, the orphaned, the retired, the unemployed and the sick” ‘ (Suruma 2000: 
13). 
In 2003, a consultant for the Bank of Uganda submitted a report on ‘Social Security in Uganda’ 
which focused almost entirely on reforming the National Social Security Fund (Lüders 2003), and opening 
up the market to private actors. The report also concluded that the PSPS ‘is probably fiscally unsustainable 
in the medium and long-run’ (Lüders 2003: 2). 
The report established several “guiding principles”, including: 
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• Social Security is to cover in the long-run in Uganda old age and survival pensions, including child 
protection; as well as invalidity, major medical health, and unemployment risks for all citizens. 
• Mandatory contributions are to finance basic benefits. Voluntary contributions finance additional 
benefits. 
• If a person’s income is not high enough to make the necessary contributions to finance basic 
benefits, government will, if financially possible, subsidise contributions. These are targeted 
demand subsidies. 
(Lüders 2003: 6) 
 
The debate on affordability of social protection often reduces to a debate around universal versus targeted 
provision. As Hickey (2003:17–18) notes, in Uganda the universalist model appears to have been rejected 
on grounds of its unsustainable costs, which means that ‘targeting is likely to become the default mode of 
reaching the poorest groups in Uganda’. The reality is more complex, however, with some recent moves 
towards universal provision in the social sectors – Universal Primary Education, the abolition of user fees 
for health services – suggesting that political commitment is as important a determinant of the 
“sustainability” of social programmes as their fiscal cost. These policies also suggest a possible precedent 
for universalist approaches in (selected areas of) social protection. The abolition of education and health 
fees was aimed at enhancing access and outreach to the poor, but was motivated as much by the 
Government of Uganda’s commitment to poverty reduction goals as by equity concerns (McGee 2000). It 
follows that a case for universal social protection measures must similarly be argued on poverty reduction 
rather than “welfarist” grounds. 
Hickey (2003) describes several cases in recent Ugandan history of political manipulation of targeted 
programmes, which compromised their poverty outreach and impact, and have created a climate of 
distrust for targeted interventions. More generally, narrowly targeted interventions are often critiqued as 
reinforcing a “projectisation” approach that is associated with instrumentalist, residualist “social safety 
net” interventions and is incompatible with new thinking that advocates institutionalised, mainstreamed, 
“social protection”. In Uganda, the inclusion of social protection as one “cross-cutting” theme in the 
Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) revision process is indicative of this progressive, holistic 
approach. It is important not to generalise, however. Some targeting is valid, necessary and politically 
popular – support for HIV/AIDS orphans being a powerful political mobiliser in Uganda, for instance. 
Another complaint against targeting is that it stigmatises and patronises “beneficiaries”. Wherever 
possible, it is important that social protection is delivered on the basis of claims being made by citizens 
with entitlements, rather than on the basis of charitable “handouts” to beneficiaries or victims, if it is to be 
truly empowering rather than disempowering. 
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3.3 Protective/promotive social protection: school feeding 
One example of a social protection intervention that can contribute to longer-term poverty reduction 
goals is school feeding schemes that provide learners with free meals at school. Because school meals 
serve two functions – providing an immediate consumption transfer to children who are often 
malnourished, and encouraging children from poor households to attend school even during difficult 
times – school feeding schemes can be characterised as serving both protective and promotive social 
protection objectives. However, making this case requires demonstrating that education generates higher 
incomes for school-leavers, that school feeding improves educational outcomes, and that school feeding is 
pro-poor. 
Education for all is not only a basic right, it is also an investment in the future. In Uganda, the right 
to education is enshrined in the Constitution of 1995, and the case for education as a driver of poverty 
reduction has been empirically proven (Appleton 2001; Lawson et al. 2003). Poverty and lack of education 
are closely correlated, while returns to education are significant, and higher for primary than for secondary 
or tertiary education. Educated Ugandans benefited most from Uganda’s strong recent growth and 
poverty reduction performance. While the national poverty headcount fell by 39 per cent during the 
1990s, it fell by only 28 per cent for Ugandans in households with uneducated heads (Appleton 2001: 4). 
A large part of the explanation is that education enhances access to non-agricultural employment, and 
Uganda’s agriculture sector grew more slowly than other sectors in the 1990s. 
School feeding is controversial, and empirical evidence on its positive and negative impacts is limited 
and inconclusive. However, several case studies have confirmed that provision of free meals at school 
increases enrolment and attendance rates, and reduces drop-out rates, and that these effects are highest 
among poorer families. School feeding even has “safety net” effects: in difficult times such as during a 
drought or conflict, providing school meals (or take-home rations – “food-for-education”) encourages 
parents to leave their children in school, rather than withdrawing them to save costs and assist in the 
search for food. Some school feeding projects have been found to reduce gender gaps in education access 
and attainment, and even to improve learners’ concentration in class and their performance in 
examinations (Bennett 2003). 
Uganda has implemented Universal Primary Education (UPE) since 1997. Under UPE, fees were 
waived for state primary schools, which resulted in a doubling of primary enrolment. Given this success in 
terms of improved access to education, the case for introducing a school feeding scheme on top of UPE 
might seem rather weak. In fact, President Museveni declared in 2003 that there should be no free school 
meals in Uganda: the Government’s responsibility is to provide teachers, classrooms and textbooks; and it 
is the responsibility of parents to send their children to school and to ensure that they are adequately fed. 
On the other hand, large numbers of Ugandan children remain outside the formal education system, 
including several groups identified by the Ministry of Education as “disadvantaged children”: children 
who have never enrolled in school; those who have dropped out; orphans; refugees; geographically and 
culturally isolated children; street children; children who must work; children with disabilities; and abused 
children (MoES 2002). UPE has not reached these vulnerable categories of children, partly because fees 
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are not the only education cost facing parents and partly because the poorest families see no immediate 
benefit in educating their children or orphans in their care. In these circumstances, providing a daily meal 
for a child from a food insecure household can provide the incentive needed, and it enhances equity of 
access to education. 
Taking these considerations into account, the Uganda Social Protection Study Team argued that 
targeted school feeding should be considered for specific vulnerable groups (such as orphans) and in areas 
where poverty is high and is recognised as a barrier to participation in education. This would include 
geographically inaccessible communities, areas with high concentrations of displaced or resettled people, 
and informal urban settlements where street children and destitute households are concentrated 
(Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2003). This recommendation supported the second Participatory Poverty 
Appraisal (UPPAP2), which recommended providing orphans with meals at school, to improve both their 
nutritional and educational status (MFPED 2002: 145). 
 
3.4 Promotive/transformative social protection: minimum wages 
Mandated minimum wages are a labour market intervention that aims to reduce poverty by raising the 
wages of the poorest categories of workers towards or above the poverty line. Intuitively, introducing 
minimum wages for workers who are paid very low wages seems an attractive policy option for social 
protection purposes: it reaches low-paid groups, it costs little to government or donors (since the cost of 
raising wages is borne by private sector employers), and it has both direct (income-enhancing) and indirect 
(multiplier effects) poverty-reducing impacts. Moreover, in addition to these “promotive” benefits, this is 
a “transformative” policy in that it empowers categories of workers who are typically either un-unionised 
and/or have little bargaining power with respect to their employers. A related argument is that those 
sectors where wages are lowest also tend to have bad working conditions, negligible benefits (no 
redundancy pay, maternity leave, or pensions) and very low job security, so that fair wages can provide 
partial compensation for the absence of job-related social protection, as enjoyed by better-paid workers. 
Despite these various benefits, minimum wages are controversial and vigorously debated, and the 
debate is often characterised as being conducted between opponents of “labour market rigidities” and 
supporters of “fair labour standards”. The theoretical case against mandated minimum wages is made on 
both efficiency and equity grounds. Economists argue that interfering with market-determined wage rates 
will create excess supply of labour in low-wage sectors, destroying jobs among the very group who were 
intended to gain from the imposition of a “fair wage”. According to this argument, the “equity” case for 
minimum wages is misguided, especially if the rate is set above the market-clearing equilibrium. In a 
competitive labour market, higher wages for some workers can only be enforced at the welfare cost of 
laying off others. Even worse, employees whose relative costs rise most because of an imposed wage 
increase – i.e. the lowest paid unskilled workers – are most vulnerable to this “disemployment” effect. A 
pragmatic argument against minimum wages is that most poor workers in developing countries fall outside  
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waged employment altogether, in “uncovered” sectors like subsistence agriculture and informal (self-) 
employment. Even if minimum wages are legislated, compliance is difficult to enforce in these sectors, so 
that the poorest segments of the working population are rarely reached (Alatas and Cameron 2003). 
The theoretical case against minimum wages has been challenged by the ‘”new economics” of the 
minimum wage’ (Lustig and McLeod 1996), which argues that the “textbook” critique is built on three 
critical assumptions – that labour markets are perfectly competitive, that workers are perfectly 
substitutable, and that perfect information exists in the economy – and that relaxing any of these 
assumptions can yield positive benefits from a minimum wage. For instance, where labour markets are 
monopsonistic – a realistic scenario in many developing countries – a higher wage rate can actually increase 
aggregate employment. The reason is that monopsony employers pay workers less than their marginal 
value product (this is known as ‘Pigovian exploitation’) and hire to a point where the marginal cost of 
labour exceeds labour supply; so forcing the monopsonist to pay a competitive wage raises the supply of 
labour towards a market-clearing equilibrium (Jones 1997: 3). Put another way, employers who are 
extracting excess profits by under-remunerating labour can afford to raise wage rates without laying off 
workers, and might even increase their profitability by hiring more workers at these higher rates. 
Empirical evidence can be found to support both proponents and opponents of minimum wages. 
One cross-country regression analysis covering 22 countries found statistically significant evidence that 
minimum wage legislation can contribute to poverty reduction: ‘minimum wages and poverty are inversely 
related: i.e., an increase (decline) in real minimum wages is accompanied by a fall (rise) in poverty’ (Lustig 
and McLeod 1996: 1). Another review of several 1990s studies found ‘little, if any, disemployment effect’ 
from minimum wage policies (Saget 2001: 21). 
Case study evidence from Africa presents a more mixed picture. Botswana introduced a Minimum 
Wage Policy in 1974, ‘to protect workers against exploitative employers who might take advantage of 
urban unemployment to push wages to excessively low levels’ (Sesinyi 1998: 8). But coverage is limited to 
private firms (manufacturing, construction, transport, trade) and government workers. Agricultural 
labourers and domestic workers are excluded, and average wages in these two sectors are well below the 
minimum wage in covered sectors. Ghana has also implemented minimum wages in its formal sector since 
the 1970s. A study of the impact of a mandated increase in the minimum wage in 1991 found that it had 
had the unintended effect of reducing manufacturing employment by 5-6 per cent, displacing workers 
who lost their jobs into the informal sector and depressing informal wages (Jones 1997). In South Africa, 
domestic workers and farm workers are recognised as two of the poorest and most vulnerable occupation 
categories, and are therefore regarded by the Department of Labour as prime candidates to benefit from a 
targeted minimum wage policy. However, a simulation exercise found that mandatory wage increases 
would result in significant job losses in the targeted sectors. Bhorat (2000) concludes that a “modest” 
minimum wage should be introduced, to send a “moral signal” to employers about the desirability of 
raising workers’ wages, but without imposing a minimum wage so high that substantial disemployment 
follows. 
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In Namibia, activists campaigning for better working conditions for farmworkers argue that 
deficiencies in the labour market allow employers to act as monopsonists, colluding with other farm-
owners in the locality to extract excess profits by under-paying their workers. The vulnerability of 
farmworkers to this exploitation arises from an over-supply of unskilled labour willing to accept very low 
wages, because of their poverty and lack of alternative employment options. Against the criticism that 
raising farmworkers’ wages through legislation will distort the labour market and result in mass 
redundancies, Chimana and Hengari (1997:12-14) argue that the market is already distorted, and that the 
excessive power of collusive employers needs to be countered by efforts to strengthen the weak 
bargaining position of unskilled workers. 
Support for the view that farm-owners in dualistic agriculture can act as monopsonists to exploit 
farmworkers comes from a study of commercial wheat production in Morocco. A small number of large 
farms in Morocco are mechanised and irrigated, but most employ some seasonal or permanent wage 
labourers drawn from the large number of small farms in their vicinity. Azam (1992) found that 
agricultural employment and wheat production increased steadily in Morocco during the 1970s and 1980s, 
despite several rises in the real minimum wage during this period. The explanation comes from 
monopsony theory: controlling for the market price of wheat, Azam found that an increase in the 
minimum wage increased wheat production and therefore the demand for labour. Azam (1992: 172) 
concluded that the minimum wage is an effective ‘device for offsetting the monopsony power of the 
employer, and for reducing the resulting Pigovian exploitation’. 
In Uganda, the debate about minimum wages is ongoing, and unresolved. Although a Minimum 
Wages Board was established in 1935, the statutory minimum wage has not been raised since 1984, and 
has collapsed in value to such an extent that it has no real effect. In some sectors, such as the agricultural 
estates, wages and conditions of employment are so bad that workers are trapped in poverty and are at the 
mercy of employers who – among other illegal or unethical practices – lay off pregnant women who have 
to reapply for their jobs after giving birth, continuously rotate casual workers so as to avoid employing 
them on a permanent basis, and force their workers to work illegally long hours (MFPED 2002). 
In Uganda, as elsewhere, economists and policymakers who are opposed to raising the minimum 
wage argue that it interferes in the market and will raise labour costs and reduce employment – but this 
assumes that markets are well-functioning. In rural Uganda, with an unregulated labour market and an 
over-supply of cheap labour, the potential for employers to pay “exploitation wages” is great, and there is 
no reason to believe that a legislated improvement in minimum wages would result in mass 
retrenchments. Most likely, it would reduce the profit margin that employers extract from their underpaid 
workers, and transfer some of that profit to the workers in the form of fairer wages. In the absence of an 
effective union for estate workers,4 the Uganda Human Rights Commission has consistently called for 
government intervention to protect workers against exploitation by raising the minimum wage to a “living 
                                                  
4 The National Union of Plantation and Agricultural Workers of Uganda (NUPAWU) was criticised as weak and 
ineffectual by plantation workers interviewed for Uganda’s second Participatory Poverty Assessment (MFPED 
2002: 72). 
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wage” level (UHRC 1999). Also, the government may need to intervene to improve working conditions to 
ensure that the law on maximum working hours is respected, that workers are provided with decent basic 
accommodation, that women are not fired for falling pregnant, and that some form of job security for 
“permanent casuals” is introduced. 
Two caveats to this proposal must be noted. Firstly, the impacts of introducing these legislative 
changes would need to be carefully monitored, both to ensure that employers adhere to them – labour 
inspections will be required – and to establish whether some estate workers are in fact retrenched if the 
labour market tightens in response to rising labour costs. This is a possible transitional effect, at least until 
the labour market adjusts to a “fair wage” regime. Adequate social protection arrangements must be in 
place to provide a safety net for these adversely affected families. Secondly, this is not an argument for 
raising the minimum wage to unrealistic levels for all sectors across the country. Instead, the argument for 
raising the statutory minimum wage must be examined on a case-by-case basis for each economic sector 
and for different parts of the country. 
A final consideration is the problem of compliance. In Uganda, civil service reform has been 
associated with severe cutbacks in personnel. The number of Labour Inspectors has fallen dramatically, to 
a level where even urban workplaces are now inadequately monitored. The capacity of the Department of 
Labour to enforce compliance would need strengthening. Also, workers employed on plantations or 
estates in tropical countries, including Uganda, are often partly remunerated in kind (food, alcohol, and 
housing), which complicates the enforceability of a minimum wage valued in cash. Nonetheless, Uganda’s 
rural labour market appears to share many relevant characteristics with Moroccan agriculture, such as 
agricultural dualism, labour immobility, and monopsonistic employers. Ceteris paribus, this would suggest 
that the introduction of a binding minimum wage (within limits) should have poverty-reducing effects 
among a highly vulnerable group of workers, with no negative consequences in the form of retrenchments 
or cutbacks in non-wage benefits. 
Summarising this evidence from six African countries, minimum wages have ambiguous effects when 
applied to either formal or informal sector workers. The Ghana study and the South African simulation 
support the conventional view that legislated minimum wages can displace workers from formal 
employment. However, the case of Moroccan agriculture confirms the view of farmworker activists in 
Namibia and Uganda that, where monopsony conditions pertain, minimum wages can achieve positive 
outcomes in terms of both social protection for exploited workers and economic growth, with no 
disemployment effects. As with many policy choices, any decision about labour market interventions must 
be based on careful analysis of the specific labour markets concerned. Minimum wages should be applied 
selectively to sectors where workers are clearly underpaid and the wage elasticity of demand for labour is 
low. Two additional challenges facing many countries that are considering introducing or extending 
minimum wages are: how to extend coverage to low-paid sectors that are traditionally difficult to regulate 
(agricultural, domestic and informal sector workers); and how to ensure compliance, which is problematic 
given the personnel constraints currently faced by most Departments of Labour in Africa. 
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3.5 Transformative social protection: anti-discrimination campaigns 
Curiously, as noted above, much of the conceptual and policy literature on social protection to date has 
been preoccupied with mechanisms for providing economic support (e.g. food aid, or cash transfers) 
against economic risks and livelihood shocks. This preoccupation has moved the concept and practice of 
social protection very little beyond the safety nets discourse of the early 1990s – which, in the terminology 
of micro-economists, aimed at smoothing consumption in the face of income variability. Conspicuously 
absent from most mainstream thinking on social protection has been a concern with the social. Our 
argument in this paper is that social protection should concern itself directly with addressing aspects of 
“social risk” and non-economic vulnerability, such as social exclusion, discrimination, and violations of 
minority rights. 
One arena of social protection that does attend to the “social” needs of socially vulnerable groups is 
campaigning against various forms of discrimination – whether on the basis of ethnicity, gender, religion, 
or sexual orientation – as part of a broader emerging agenda around upholding economic, social and 
cultural rights. A good example is the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW), a United Nations campaign during the 1990s that raised awareness about 
gender discrimination in countries across the world. 
Recently, concerns have been raised about the nature of formal and non-formal responses to 
HIV/AIDS, specifically its “social impacts” in terms of the burden of caring and attitudes towards people 
living with AIDS (PLWA). In Uganda, which was the epicentre of HIV/AIDS in Africa during the 1980s, 
the pandemic has had a terrible impact, causing over 800,000 estimated deaths and creating over 2 million 
single- or double-parent orphans – almost one child in five. Approximately 25 per cent of Ugandan 
households now include one or more orphans. Many of these are elderly- or widow-headed households, 
under traditional arrangements of caring for orphans through extended family and kinship relationships, 
which tends to place the burden of care on women. These informal social protection mechanisms are 
coming under severe strain, as the costs of caring for the ill and providing for the food and clothing needs 
of large numbers of dependants is stretching the limited resources of poor Ugandan families beyond their 
capacity to cope. Orphans who are not located in extended families or supportive communities, and are 
not taken into reception centres, often become street children, surviving by begging or petty crime. 
In the late 1990s, the Government of Uganda launched a “crusade” against HIV/AIDS, with strong 
donor support, under the umbrella of a five-year National Strategic Framework for reducing prevalence 
rates and strengthening national response capacity (UNDP 2000: 16). HIV sero-prevalence did in fact 
decline between 1996 and 2000, from 10 per cent to 8.3 per cent, largely because of changes in sexual 
behaviour among the Ugandan population (Republic of Uganda 2001: 104). In this period, the 
government’s response to AIDS focused on creating awareness about the causes of HIV transmission, 
encouraging behavioural change – including challenging cultural practices such as re-marrying of widows 
by the brother of the deceased – and promoting the use and availability of condoms. 
A parallel set of interventions has also emerged in many high-prevalence African countries since the 
1980s, focusing more on the consequences of the disease than its prevention. Recognising the costs that 
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HIV/AIDS imposes on the livelihoods and coping capacity of poor households, these initiatives aim to 
provide various forms of support to PLWA, “AIDS orphans” and carers. A number of institutions and 
initiatives are engaged with these issues in Uganda. These include major donors such as Belgium Survival 
Fund, DFID, GTZ, NORAD, SIDA, UNICEF and USAID; international NGOs such as ActionAid, 
Feed the Children, and Save the Children UK; and local NGOs and CBOs including the Uganda Red 
Cross Society and UWESO (Uganda Women’s Effort to Save Orphans). These initiatives are enormously 
important to the people they assist, but they are also patchy and limited in impact, with incomplete 
coverage across the country and variable provision of support – from blankets, vocational training and 
reception centres for orphans, to microcredit and nutritional advice for orphan carers. 
Most of these measures can be characterised as standard social assistance interventions to meet the 
subsistence needs of PLWA and orphans for care, food, health, housing and education. These measures 
address the reality that HIV/AIDS has deepened poverty in Ugandan households, as affected families lose 
productive labour, sell off assets to care for terminally ill members, and pay burial costs after a death. In 
other words, these measures address the economic costs of HIV/AIDS at the household level. Until 
recently, relatively little attention was given to the “social costs” of AIDS, such as the problems faced by 
PLWA in terms of securing or retaining employment, the stigma and social exclusion faced by bereaved 
relatives, the vulnerability of widows to being remarried against their will, and the risks faced by orphans 
of being abused or neglected. 
In a special session on AIDS in June 2001, the United Nations General Assembly passed a 
declaration of commitment to fight AIDS, which included a global target for all UN member states to 
enact or strengthen anti-discrimination protection for people living with HIV/AIDS. In 2002, the 
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent societies (IFRC) launched its own ‘HIV/AIDS 
Anti-Stigma and Discrimination Campaign’, in support of the United Nations declaration. Under this 
global initiative, the Uganda Red Cross Society launched a two-year campaign in July 2002, aimed at 
eliminating stigma and discrimination against Ugandans living with HIV/AIDS, in accordance with the 
commitment of the IFRC to ‘making a difference in the lives of the vulnerable’ (URCS 2002). A key 
message of the campaign was: ‘AIDS is a disease and not a disgrace’. The intention was to challenge 
attitudes and practices that discriminate against PLWA, such as employers insisting on job applicants 
taking pre-employment HIV tests, and rejecting all HIV-positive applicants. The overarching objective of 
the campaign was: ‘to contribute to the change in perceptions, attitudes, policies and behaviour towards 
PLWA, in order to ensure that those people who are already HIV+ or have AIDS are able to receive the 
appropriate care, have access to affordable drugs and can live full and useful lives within their 
communities’ (URCS 2002). 
This campaign can be characterised as a “transformative social protection” measure. Unlike 
conventional social safety net or “protective social protection” measures, anti-discrimination measures 
address the social rather than economic needs of a socially vulnerable group. Like minimum wages, this is 
an affordable intervention, since it has negligible implications for public spending or donor budgets. Anti-
discrimination campaigns also have the potential to be “protective” and “promotive” as well as 
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“transformative”. It is well documented that discrimination reduces the livelihood opportunities of 
affected groups. Affirmative action campaigns to promote minority groups, such as black South Africans 
or low-caste Indians, recognise that social exclusion carries economic costs, and attempt to intervene in 
the labour market to correct for this socio-economic discrimination. Similarly, the anti-stigma campaign in 
Uganda attempts to ensure that hostility towards people living with HIV/AIDS does not undermine their 
ability to earn a living. 
 
4  Conclusion 
By arguing in this paper for an approach to social protection that emphasises social justice we are not 
arguing against the important “safety net” role that social protection has conventionally played, in terms of 
safeguarding lives and livelihoods in contexts of chronic and acute economic risk and vulnerability. 
Instead, we are focusing attention on the relatively neglected area of social risk and vulnerability, and 
building a case for a stronger role for social protection in terms of empowering the poor and transforming 
the conditions in which they struggle to construct viable livelihoods. 
Although the socially vulnerable – orphans, people living with HIV/AIDS, ethnic minorities – often 
need income and consumption support, social protection, properly conceptualised, is not just “economic 
protection”. Poverty and vulnerability are about social deprivation as well as economic deprivation, and an 
elaborated understanding of social protection has the potential to address both the material needs and the 
social inequities faced by poor, vulnerable and marginalised individuals and groups. 
Apart from establishing a more positive and proactive role for social protection that extends its scope 
beyond its roots in residualist and often stigmatised social safety nets, there are other reasons for 
supporting the “transformative” component of social protection. Firstly, “transformative social 
protection” is generally more fiscally affordable than “economic social protection”, which is universally 
unpopular with economists and policymakers because it implies expensive transfers of public resources to 
large numbers of people who are generally regarded as having low or zero productivity (McDonald et al. 
1999). In developing countries, policymakers face binding fiscal constraints that limit their public spending 
choices, so the identification of low-cost interventions that can significantly improve the livelihoods of the 
poor – such as mandated minimum wages, whose cost is borne by employers rather than the state, or anti-
discrimination campaigns that have negligible fiscal implications – is doubly attractive. 
Secondly, we have identified powerful synergies between the “economic” (protective, preventive, 
promotive) and “social” (transformative) roles performed by several social protection measures 
considered in this paper. We have noted that income or consumption transfers such as school feeding 
schemes or public works projects have the dual aims of providing immediate protection against nutritional 
deprivation and investing in durable assets – human capital through education and physical capital 
through community-level infrastructure, respectively – which endow these interventions with both 
“protective”  and  “promotive”  potential.  By  empowering  low-paid  workers  to  claim  fairer wages and 
 27 
challenging employers to provide better working conditions, minimum wage legislation simultaneously 
raises incomes (which is “promotive”) and enhances workers’ rights and bargaining power in the labour 
market (which is “transformative”). 
It is true that most social protection measures – school feeding, public works, minimum wages – are 
controversial, and heated debates around the merits and (cost-) effectiveness of specific interventions will 
certainly continue. For positive social protection objectives to be achieved, the package of measures 
actually adopted must be carefully selected, prudently designed and effectively implemented. Nonetheless, 
the point remains that transformative social protection can be affordable while contributing to the 
fundamental policy goals of pro-poor economic growth and improved social equity. A comprehensive and 
coherent package of social protection measures can support a development trajectory that maximises the 
reduction of both poverty and inequity, without breaking the national budget. 
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